This paper examines the dynamic relationships of financial openness with economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty using a panel of countries over the period . By employing the pooled mean group approach of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), we find that there exists an intertemporal tradeoff between financial globalization and economic growth. Greater financial openness appears to have short-run negative but long-run positive effect on economic growth. The evidence also shows that while being statistically insignificant in the short run, greater financial account openness, especially FDI, tends to reduce output growth uncertainty and consumption growth uncertainty in the long run.
Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed dramatic capital account liberalization in many countries, including developing and emerging countries. While some countries have benefited from financial liberalization, others have not enjoyed higher economic growth or have even experienced severe financial crises and recessions in the years following liberalization. Hence, a question as to whether financial openness, as advanced by the IMF and World Bank, is an essential key to sustained economic growth requires further clarification. This paper represents an attempt to provide new evidence on the effect of financial openness on growth, using modern panel data techniques, which take full advantage both of the cross section and time series variations available in recent samples. It also addresses the question of whether capital account liberalization mitigates macroeconomic uncertainty.
Not surprisingly, despite intensive research has devoted to the issue, the literature on growth effects of financial openness has produced conflicting, if not contradictory, conclusions.
1 There are some arguments for financial openness. Financial account openness stimulates capital accumulation, productivity growth and hence economic growth by relaxing financial constraints through greater access to external capital, by enhancing production specialization through improved risk-sharing, by promoting more disciplined macroeconomic policies under the international pressure, and increasing the functioning of domestic financial systems through the intensification of competition and the importation of financial services. Others claim that the benefits of international risk sharing may not be realized or limited due to home asset preference, 2 imperfect market integration or incomplete insurance markets, 3 and twin 1 Please see Eichengreen (2001) , Mishkin (2007a, b) for more detailed discussions. 2 Please see French and Poterba (1991) , Tesar and Werner (1995) , Baxter and Jermann (1997) , Lewis (1999) . 3 Please see Feldstein and Horioka (1980) , Harvey (1995, 2000) .
agency problems. 4 Some even argue that financial openness can actually retard economic growth in the presence of weak institutions and policies such as weak financial and legal systems, and in the presence of information asymmetric information and hidden action.
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Such theoretical ambiguity on the effects of openness is also reflected in the available empirical evidence. While Quinn (1997) , Edison et al. (2002) and Henry (2000a Henry ( , 200b, 2003 show a positive effect of capital account liberalization on growth, Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2003) , Rodrik (1998) , Kraay (1998) , and Gine and Townsend (2004) conclude that such relation is either fragile or not significant. Some studies even detect a significant positive effect of financial integration on growth only for countries with better financial development, high human capital, good institutions and macroeconomic policies. Similarly, the literature on financial openness and macroeconomic uncertainty, despite being scarce, yields ambiguous conclusions. Financial integration may contribute to more output stability by providing greater access to capital that can help capital-poor countries diversify their production base. However, rising financial integration may lead to increasing specification of production based on comparative advantage considerations, thereby making economies more vulnerable to industry-specific shocks (Razin and Rose, 1994; Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha, 2003) . Alternatively, financial globalization may help promote institutional reforms that can make the financial system more stable, thereby contributing to more output 4 Please see Stulz (2005) . 5 Please see Boyd and Smith (1992) , Stiglitz (2000) , Eichengreen (2000) , and Klein (2005) . 6 Please see Wyplosz (2001), Prasad et. al. (2003) , Klein (2005) , Klein and Olivei (2005) , and Masten, Coricelli and Masten (2008) . 7 Another set of empirical studies suggest that composition of capital flows determines the effects of financial integration on economic growth (Reisen and Soto, 2001 ). In particular, these studies conclude that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows tend to have positive impacts on growth in those countries with a sufficient level of human capital (Borenzstein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998) and well-developed domestic financial markets (Alfaro et al.,2004). stability. However, financial globalization makes it easier for capital inflows to fuel excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions and allows financial shocks to be transmitted more readily across borders (Mishkin, 2006) .
Irrespective of the effects on output volatility, theoretical models based on complete markets suggest that financial integration should reduce consumption volatility. Access to international financial markets provides better risk-sharing opportunities for consumers to smooth consumption growth in the face of country-specific fluctuations in output growth and hence delink fluctuations in national consumption and output (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) . However, in Levchenko (2005) , when domestic risk sharing is subject to frictions and when risks are purely idiosyncratic, that is, perfectly insurable within the domestic economy, opening up to international markets reduces the amount of risk sharing attained at home and raises the volatility of consumption.
Empirically, while Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2006) find that financial integration does not significantly affect output volatility, Loayza and Raddatz (2007) show that financial openness mitigates the consequences of external shocks. With respect to consumption risk sharing, while some papers point to strongly positive effects of financial openness on consumption growth volatility (e.g. Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003) , others point to negative effects (e.g. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2006; Buch and Yener, 2009 (Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999; Reinhart, 2000, 2002) .
Also, the financial crisis literature predicts that financial globalization encourages risk-taking, generates financial fragility and increases risk of financial crises, 8 which often have severe recessionary consequences (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000; Agenor, 2003; Tornell, Westermann and Martinez, 2004 ).
These observations imply that the process of capital account liberalization is accompanied not only by financial deepening and institutional quality improving that have long-run impacts on economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty, but also by financial fragility and crises that have short-run effects on business cycles. In other words, there may be a potential intertemporal tradeoff between openness and growth or uncertainty. Accordingly, distinguishing the cyclical and trend components of financial openness in determining the effects of openness on growth or uncertainty in the short and long run has important policy implications: that how to supplement financial openness with policies that would improve this intertemporal tradeoff. The answer depends crucially on the time horizon of the analysis and cross-section experiences of countries. However, the empirical literature relies frequently on cross-country methodology and thus provides us with little guidance in evaluating the net effects of financial opening.
8 There are three different risks associated with globalization and crises. The first one is the maturity risk derived from the shortening of maturity structure, which exposes borrowers to potential rollover difficulties and interest rate fluctuations (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006) . The second risk is the over-borrowing syndrome, which arises because financial liberalization can generate lending booms and over-investment under the presence of moral hazard (Mckinnon and Pill, 1997) . And the last risk is the exchange rate mismatch, which occurs because of the rise of foreign currency debt, while the income of borrowing countries remains in domestic currency (Jeanne, 2000; and Frankel and Rose, 1996) . As put forth in Loayza and Ranciere (2006) , while averaging clearly induces a loss of information, it is not obvious that averaging over fixed-length intervals effectively eliminates business-cycle fluctuations; averaging eliminates information that may be used to estimate a more flexible model that allow for some parameter heterogeneity across countries. Averaging hides the dynamic relationship between inflation and financial development, particularly, the presence of opposite effects at different time frequencies. 10 The PMG estimator has been recently applied to measure the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on investment (Byrne and Davis, 2005a, b) , to assess the trade effect of real effective exchange rates by (Catao and Solomou, 2005) , to estimate the impacts of fiscal deficits on inflation (Catao and Terrones, 2005) , to estimate the relationship between financial development and economic growth (Loayza and Ranciere, 2006) , and to examine the relationship between inequality and growth (Frank, 2008) .
openness and economic growth. Greater financial openness appears to have short-run negative but long-run positive effects on output growth. The data also reveal that financial globalization has no significant short-run effect but strongly negative long-run impacts on output growth uncertainty and consumption growth volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ARDL models and alternative estimation procedures. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 reports empirical results of financial openness on economic growth and Section 5 depicts empirical results of financial openness on macroeconomic uncertainty. Section 6 concludes the analysis.
Methodology
To examine the long-run effects of financial openness on economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty, it is common to estimate the following standard cross-country growth and uncertainty regression: 
By grouping the variables in levels, equation (3) can be rewritten as .
it x
As argued in Catao and Solomou (2005) and Catao and Terrones (2005) , the ARDL specification in equation (4), where all explanatory variables enter the regression with lags, not only allows us to mitigate the contemporaneous feedback and reverse causality running from economic growth (and macroeconomic uncertainty) to financial openness, 11 but also accommodates the substantial persistence of growth (and uncertainty) adjustments and captures potentially rich financial openness adjustment dynamics. In addition, the model allows for heterogeneity in the relationships of financial openness with economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty across countries since the various parameters in equation (4) are not restricted to be the same across countries. Finally, the ARDL approach allows us to estimate an empirical model that encompasses the long-and short-run effects of financial openness on economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty using a data field composed of a relatively large sample of countries and annual observations. Equation (4) can be estimated using three different procedures. The first one is the mean group (MG) estimator introduced by Pesaran and Smith (1995) . This approach amounts to estimate separate ARDL regressions for each group and obtain θ and φ as simple averages of individual group coefficients i θ and .
i φ In particular, Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the MG estimator will provide consistent estimates of the average of parameters interested. The second one is the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) pooled mean group (PMG) estimator which restricts the long-run parameters to be identical over the cross section, but allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients (including the speed of adjustment), and error variances to differ across groups on the cross section. If the long-run homogeneity restrictions are valid, it is known that MG estimates will be inefficient. In this case, the maximum likelihood-based PMG approach proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) will yield a more efficient estimator. 12 As shown in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) , the validity of a cross-sectional, long-run homogeneity restriction of the form , θ θ = i (and hence the suitability of the PMG estimator) can be tested by a standard Hausman-type statistic. The last one is the more standard dynamic fixed-effects (DFE) method which allows the intercepts to differ across groups, but
imposes homogeneity of all slope coefficients and error variances. The DFE procedure is subject to the lagged dependent variable bias, but this bias may go away with sufficient time series observations (Nickell, 1981) .
Data Description
Our data are from several sources and cover the period 1960-2007. We include only those countries that have at least 15 consecutive observations as required by the PMG procedure on the time-series dimension of the data. And this leaves at most 70 countries available. Country-specific economic growth rates, measured as the logarithmic real growth rate of GDP per capita, for each year are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. Also from that database are real GDP per capita, CPI inflation, and financial development measured by the domestic credits to private sector as a share of GDP. These control variables are among the standards that have been used in estimating growth models.
To estimate the effects of financial openness on macroeconomic uncertainty, we need a measure for macroeconomic uncertainty. The literature suggests various methods to obtain a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. In our investigation, as in Driver, Temple, and Urga (2005) and Byrne and Davis (2005b) , we use a GARCH-type model to generate conditional standard deviations as a proxy for output and consumption growth uncertainty. 13 We believe that this approach is more appropriate compared to alternatives such as proxies obtained from moving standard deviations of the macroeconomic series (e.g., Ghosal and Loungani 2000) or survey-based measures based on the dispersion of forecasts (e.g., Graham and Harvey 2001; Schmukler, Mehrez, and Kaufmann 1999) . While the former approach suffers from substantial serial correlation problems in the constructed series, the latter 13 Data on private consumption growth are obtained from the WDI of the World Bank.
potentially contains sizable measurement errors.
As a measure of financial openness, we follow Chanda ( For the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability), the coefficient on the error-correction term should be negative and within the unit circle. As seen in Table 3 , the error-correction coefficient estimates are significantly negative and fall within the dynamically stable range for PMG, MG and DFE estimators, suggesting that external financial stocks and economic growth are cointegrated. We also find pooling leads to a much smaller speed of adjustment and corresponding standard error. 14 Bussiere and Fratzscher (2008) point out that one reason for lack of evidence in favor of a robust openness-growth nexus in cross-country studies is due to the fact that while developed economies have liberalized capital accounts, those emerging markets and transition countries have done so relatively recently, and mostly between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. Therefore, as a robustness check, we use different starting periods to examine the links among growth, uncertainty and openness. 15 The order of the ARDL process for each country must be augmented to ensure that the residual of the error-correction model be exogenous and serially uncorrelated. At the same time, with a limited number of time-series observations, the ARDL order should not be overextended as this imposes excessive parameter requirements on the data. When the main interest is on the long-run parameters, the lag order of the ARDL can be selected using some consistent information criteria (such as the Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion) on a country-by-country basis. However, when there is also interest in analyzing and comparing the short-run parameters, it is recommended to impose a common lag structure across countries, in accordance to the characteristics of the analytical model to be studied and the limitations of the data. We use the latter approach in this paper's implementation of the ARDL approach.
Empirical Results

Financial Openness and Economic Growth
Regarding the long-run openness coefficient, the PMG estimate tends to be close to the DFE estimate, but different from the MG estimate. Moreover, we find that pooling sharpens the estimates considerably; the standard errors of both PMG and DFE are much smaller than those of MG, and the PMG and DFE estimates are statistically much more significant than the MG estimates are. Further, the long-run homogeneity restriction cannot be rejected at conventional levels by the Hausman test statistics, indicating that the PMG estimate is preferable to the MG estimate. The PMG estimate of the long-run coefficient of openness measure on economic growth is 1.1243 and 3.5978 with the corresponding standard error of 0.2899 and 0.8642 for the 1960-2007 and 1987-2007period , respectively. The significant positive long-run coefficient estimate suggests that the higher levels of gross external assets and liabilities improve economic growth. And the results hold after controlling for short-run financial risk, in line with Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) and Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2008) , finding that countries with greater financial globalization grow faster when controlling for crises.
However, the short-run coefficients on financial openness tell a different story.
As explained, short-run coefficients are not restricted to be the same across countries so that we do not have a single pooled estimate for each coefficient. Nevertheless, we can still analyze the average short-run effect by considering the mean of the corresponding coefficients across countries. As Table 3 shows, imposing the long-run homogeneity restriction also reduces the standard errors of the financial openness coefficients. And since the PMG approach allows the short-run dynamic specification to differ from country to country, it confirms once again that the PMG model is preferable to the MG model. The PMG estimate of average short-run effects is highly significant and negative with magnitude of -2.6488 and -3.6136 for the 1960-2007 and 1987-2007 period, respectively. The negative short-run average estimates suggest that higher financial market openness hinders output growth, in line with the view that the increased risk of financial instability and crises with financial account globalization induces greater financial volatility and recessions. It also agrees with the sudden stop hypothesis that financial account liberalization may actually destabilize the economy, and the financial accelerator hypothesis that financial globalization propagates and exaggerates external shocks to the economy in the short run.
The similar results are found using the FDI stock measure in Table 4 . Taken together, comparing the long-and short-run estimates, the openness-growth nexus depends on whether their movements are temporary or permanent. And, the findings of coexistence of positive long-run effects and negative short-run effects imply that there indeed exists a dynamic tradeoff between de-facto financial openness and economic growth. The findings contradict Pill (1997, 1999) , Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) and Bussiere and Fratzscher (2008) . These studies either theoretically or empirically demonstrate that countries opening up their financial markets may experience investment boom and higher growth in the short run, but may not grow faster or even experience growth reversals in the medium to long term. Our evidence seems to be in line with the predictions of Aizenman (2002) and Tornell, Westermann and Martinez (2004) that the fragility induced by financial opening leads frequently to devastating financial crises in the short run, but if these crises would force the country to deal with its structural deficiencies, financial opening may induce a higher growth rate in the long run.
Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Uncertainty
This section presents estimation results of financial openness on macroeconomic uncertainty. The results for output growth uncertainty and consumption growth are presented in Tables 5-8, respectively. As indicated in these Tables, the pooled error-correction coefficient estimates are significantly negative and fall within the dynamically stable range for PMG, MG and DFE estimators, suggesting that de-facto financial openness measures and macroeconomic uncertainty indicators are cointegrated. Moreover, the standard errors of both PMG and DFE are much smaller than those of MG, meaning that pooling makes estimates more accurate. In addition, the Hausman test does not reject long-run homogeneity restriction, indicating that the PMG estimator is more suitable for the analysis, relative to the MG estimator.
Accordingly, the following analysis focuses on the PMG approach.
First, we check whether financial globalization exerts its effect on output growth uncertainty. In Table 5 , we find that, across alternative time periods, long-run coefficient of financial openness is negative and significant. It suggests that openness tends to reduce output growth uncertainty in the long run. And, a one percentage increase in the stocks of gross external assets and liabilities would lead output growth uncertainty to drop by 0.0749 and 0.1175 standard deviations in the long run for the period 1960-2007 and 1987-2007 period, respectively. However, the short-run average relationship between financial openness and output growth uncertainty is not statistically significantly. That is, on average, financial openness has minor impacts on output uncertainty in the short run.
When considering the effect of FDI in Table 6 , we find quite similar results as that in Table 5 . As Table 6 indicates, across alternative time periods, long-run coefficient of FDI is negative and significant, suggesting that greater FDI stocks tend to lessen output growth uncertainty in the long run. Moreover, a one percentage increase in FDI stocks is associated with an increase in output growth uncertainty of 0.0273 and 0.0057 standard deviations in the long run for the period 1960-2007 and 1987-2007 period, respectively. However, the short-run average relationship between FDI and output growth uncertainty is not statistically significantly, implying that FDI, on average, has unimportant impacts on output uncertainty in the short run. Our evidence thus implies that de-facto financial openness not only stimulates economic growth but also mitigates growth uncertainty in the long run, consistent with Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoenig (2008) .
Next, we examine whether financial globalization provides better opportunities for consumers to smooth consumption growth. Table 7 shows that, for the full period, while the short-run average relationship between financial openness and consumption growth uncertainty is not statistically significantly, the long-run effect of financial openness on consumption growth uncertainty is negative and highly significant. By contrast, for the period 1987-2007, the long-run coefficient of financial openness turns significantly positive, though the short-run coefficient keeps statistically insignificant.
In Table 8 where FDI is used to proxy for financial openness, we find that across different time periods, long-run coefficient of FDI is negative and significant. It suggests that higher FDI tends to weaken consumption growth uncertainty in the long run. In other worlds, FDI appears to have beneficial effect on the extent of risk sharing. And, a one percentage increase in the FDI stocks would lead consumption growth uncertainty to drop by 0.0614 and 0.0061 standard deviations in the long run for the period 1960-2007 and 1987-2007 period, respectively. In the short run, there seems no significant relationship between FDI and consumption growth uncertainty.
Conclusions
It is recognized that financial opening not only increases the chance of financial crises and fragility that have short-run consequences on economic fluctuations, but also strengthens financial deepening and institutional development that affects long-run economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty. It implies that there may be a complex tradeoff between the adverse short-run and beneficial long-run effects of financial opening. Accordingly, this project intends to advance previous research and contribute to existing literature by explicitly distinguishing the cyclical and trend effects of financial openness both on economic growth and macroeconomic uncertainty. This is implemented with an innovative ARDL modeling that allows for exploring both the time-series dimension and cross-country difference to assess the short-and long-run effects of financial openness.
Using the PMG estimation procedure and based on a panel of countries over the 1970-2007 period, we find coexistence of short-run adverse and long-run beneficial effects of financial globalization on economic growth, confirming that there is short-run pains and long-run gains in the process of financial globalization. As an additional benefit of globalization, the data show that output growth uncertainty decreases with financial account liberalization in the long run, suggesting financial openness as one potential determinant contributing to the great moderation. We also find evidence of decreasing uncertainty of consumption growth with FDI, indicating that de-facto financial integration allows countries to improve the degree of international consumption risk sharing by diversifying their income idiosyncratic risk. Note: Control variables include income, inflation and financial development. For simplicity, the estimates for control variables are not reported but available upon request. The values in the parentheses (brackets) are the standard errors (p-values) of corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: Control variables include income, inflation and financial development. For simplicity, the estimates for control variables are not reported but available upon request. The values in the parentheses (brackets) are the standard errors (p-values) of corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: Control variables include income, inflation and financial development. For simplicity, the estimates for control variables are not reported but available upon request. The values in the parentheses (brackets) are the standard errors (p-values) of corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
